LEADER 03813cam a2200409Ia 4500001 136015 005 20240621203821.0 008 080116s2006 xx rb 000 0 eng d 028 52 3201131 |bUMI 035 (OCoLC)ocn310971330 035 136015 049 LHMA 040 LHM |beng |erda |cLHM 090 B2430.L484 |bK57 2005 100 1 Kirby, Katherine E. 245 14 The ethical priority of infinite obligation : |bLevinasian vulnerability as the condition for the possibility of virtue / |cby Katherine E. Kirby. 264 1 [Place of publication not identified] : |b[publisher not identified], |c2006. 300 vi, 350 pages 336 text |btxt |2rdacontent 337 unmediated |bn |2rdamedia 338 volume |bnc |2rdacarrier 502 Thesis (Ph.D.)--Fordham University, 2006. 504 Includes bibliographical references (pages 342-350). 520 My argument throughout this project is that, while virtue ethics can provide a necessary alternative to modern moral theory's application of universal laws, it is problematic to understand the ethical relation as grounded in the symmetry and reciprocity of friendship-type engagements. I therefore argue that virtue theory, and any rational conception of the "good," must be grounded in a more primordial moment of fundamentally asymmetrical obligation, which is revealed rather than rationally constituted. I draw on Levinas' account of ethical encounter as arising out of the address of the Other, which awakens in the subject a Desire for peaceful contact with the unique and precious Other. Desire leads the subject to willingly undergo a transformation in her orientation, as she devotes herself to genuine concern and loving care for the Other. My argument is driven by an exploration of the nature of heroic action, with a particular focus on accounts of rescue during the Nazi Holocaust.I introduce the problem of asymmetry through an examination of contemporary virtue ethics. I then turn to Ricoeur's endeavor to ground ethics in virtue theory, making preliminary suggestions as to the proper role for rationality in ethics. In order to locate my discussion in reflection upon actual ethical experience, I then discuss accounts of rescue during the Holocaust, in light of Aristotle's understanding of ethics and Levinas' description of what guides and motivates self-sacrifice. In turning to Husserl, I return to the problem of rationality's role in ethics, arguing that Levinas' notion of the Other as not merely an "alter-ego" provides a necessary explanation of the urgency of the moral endeavor. Finally, through a discussion of Buber's work, I return to the problem of reciprocity, arguing that such cannot be required of ethical relations. I conclude this work by pointing in the direction of the following further developments: (1) A notion of ethical care related to feminist care ethics; (2) A proper understanding of friendship; (3) A new kind of freedom, understood as a liberation from the constraining world of the Same; and (4) A new notion of happiness to be found in sacrifice. 530 Electronic version(s) |bavailable internally at USHMM. 533 Photocopy. |bAnn Arbor, Mich. : |cUMI Dissertation Services, |d2007. |e22 cm. 590 Dissertations and Theses 591 Record updated by Marcive processing 21 June 2024 600 10 Lévinas, Emmanuel |xCriticism and interpretation. 650 0 Virtue. 650 0 Duty. 650 0 Ethics. 856 41 |uhttp://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1068257351&sid=12&Fmt=6&clientId=54617&RQT=309&VName=PQD |zElectronic version from ProQuest 956 41 |u http://dc.ushmm.org/library/bib136015/3201131.pdf |z Hosted by USHMM. 852 0 |bstacks |hB2430.L484 |iK57 2005 852 |bwww 852 0 |bebook