Individual responsibility in the context of genocide / by Stephen R. Kifer.

After the world learned of the Jewish Holocaust that occurred in Nazi Germany during World War II, the phrase "never again" has often been recited. To codify the repulsion and horror felt about this tragedy, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was formulated by the United Nations and widely adopted by the international community. Despite this, acts of genocide have not stopped, as evidenced by tragedies in Srebrenica and Rwanda, among others. In moral theory, genocide is relatively unique in that it is an act that is nearly impossible for an individual to commit. The very scale of the act of genocide practically requires collective action, but collective responsibility is something that is difficult to grapple with. Frequently participants in an act of genocide will attempt to disassociate themselves in various ways from the actual crime in order to absolve themselves of any responsibility for the acts. In this thesis, I will look at three possible moral responses that an individual who is a part of a collective that is committing an immoral, collective action could take, whether such actions would absolve the individual of responsibility and whether it would be reasonable to expect the individual to take such actions.